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Abstract: Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks raise
major concerns about users’ privacy. They employ Ma-
chine Learning (ML) techniques to allow a local pas-
sive adversary to uncover the Web browsing behavior of
a user, even if she browses through an encrypted tun-
nel (e.g. Tor, VPN). Numerous defenses have been pro-
posed in the past; however, it is typically difficult to
have formal guarantees on their security, which is most
often evaluated empirically against state-of-the-art at-
tacks. In this paper, we present a practical method to
derive security bounds for any WF defense, where the
bounds depend on a chosen feature set. This result de-
rives from reducing WF attacks to an ML classification
task, where we can determine the smallest achievable
error (the Bayes error). Such error can be estimated in
practice, and is a lower bound for a WF adversary, for
any classification algorithm he may use. Our work has
two main consequences: i) it allows determining the se-
curity of WF defenses, in a black-box manner, with re-
spect to the state-of-the-art feature set and ii) it favors
shifting the focus of future WF research to identifying
optimal feature sets. The generality of this approach fur-
ther suggests that the method could be used to define
security bounds for other ML-based attacks.
Keywords: website fingerprinting, privacy metric
1 Introduction
Secure network protocols often fail at hiding the length
of packets, their timing, or the total communication
bandwidth. In the past, it was shown that Traffic Anal-
ysis (TA) adversaries can use such information to profile
users, break the confidentiality of their communications,
or violate their anonymity [2, 11, 29].
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Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks are an impor-
tant subclass of TA. In WF, a local adversary observes
the encrypted network traffic produced by a victim load-
ing a web page, selects high level descriptions of this
traffic (features), and uses a Machine Learning (ML)
classifier on them to predict which page the victim vis-
its, even if she browses through an encrypted tunnel
(e.g., Tor, VPN). In the specific case of Tor, it was
shown that a WF adversary controlling the Guard node
of a victim browsing an .onion site can perform this
attack with high success probability [16]. Since the at-
tack would go undetected, and because of the harm such
anonymity breach can cause to the victim, WF attacks
constitute a serious threat for the Tor network.
WF defenses have been proposed in the past. Un-
fortunately, the most common method to evaluate their
security so far has been testing them against state-of-
the-art attacks. This inevitably created an arms race,
which has continued for more than a decade [5, 11, 13,
17, 18, 20, 26, 30]. The concerns raised by novel attacks
led researchers to reconsider defense BuFLO [11], which
was initially proposed as a proof-of-concept representing
very secure but inefficient countermeasures, as a candi-
date for real-world applications [6].
The first study towards provable security evaluation
of WF defenses considered an idealized lookup-table
adversary, who knows the exact network traffic corre-
sponding to each web page, and only commits an error
when many pages produce identical traffic [5]. Unfor-
tunately, this method is highly susceptible to noise, as
a small difference in the measured quantities strongly
impacts the results. Furthermore, this approach is not
applicable to a large class of defenses (probabilistic de-
fenses), which is a dramatic constraint for defenses de-
signers. Because of these shortcomings, most defenses
are still evaluated against state-of-the-art attacks.
In this paper, we provide a natural formalization of
WF attacks as an ML classification problem. This allows
showing that the success of a WF adversary is bounded,
with respect to the features he uses, by the success of the
ideal Bayes classifier. We then indicate a lower bound
estimate of the Bayes error, which is asymptotically the
smallest error achievable by any classifier.
We summarize our contributions as follows.
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Closed World One VS All Overhead
Defense Rˆ∗ (%) (ε,Φ)-privacy Rˆ∗ (%) (ε,Φ)-privacy Packet (%) Time (%)
No Defense 6.2 ± 0.3 (0.06, k-NN) 2.5 ± 1.7 (0.05, k-NN) 0.0 0.0
Decoy Pages 42.6 ± 0.6 (0.43, k-NN) 14.7 ± 5.5 (0.29, k-NN) 134.4 59.0
BuFLO 56.9 ± 1.0 (0.58, k-FP) 14.4 ± 13.7 (0.29, k-FP) 110.1 79.1
Tamaraw 69.0 ± 0.9 (0.70, k-NN) 12.7 ± 5.8 (0.25, k-NN) 257.6 341.4
CS-BuFLO 61.9 ± 0.9 (0.63, k-FP) 8.1 ± 3.5 (0.16, k-FP) 67.2 575.6
WTF-PAD 48.6 ± 1.2 (0.49, k-FP) 9.0 ± 3.8 (0.18, CUMUL) 247.0 0.0
Table 1. Bayes lower bounds Rˆ∗ and (ε,Φ)-privacy of WF defenses on the WCN+ dataset. A lower bound Rˆ∗ is the smallest error an
adversary achieves in a specific scenario (Closed World, One VS All). The metric (ε,Φ)-privacy indicates how far a defense is from
perfection (achieved for ε = 1). In bold, the most (ε,Φ)-private defenses. We use the name of an attack to indicate its feature set Φ.
Security bounds
We show that a WF adversary using a certain feature set
is bounded by the Bayes error, of which we can estimate
a lower bound. This is guaranteed to be an asymptotic
lower bound of the adversary’s error, for any classifier he
may choose. The bound holds for arbitrary distributions
of data, under the standard i.i.d. assumption. We verify
the bound in practice, for a finite number of examples.
(ε,Φ)-privacy
We propose a privacy metric, (ε,Φ)-privacy, based on
the lower bound error estimate. The metric indicates
how far a defense is from a perfectly private one (ε = 1),
and depends on a feature set Φ. It can be used to evalu-
ate the security of any defense, in a black-box manner.
This result also allows WF researchers to shift their at-
tention to identifying optimal features.
Evaluation
We compare the most influential defenses in terms of
their (ε,Φ)-privacy and overheads (Table 1). Further-
more, we use the lower bound estimates to evaluate fea-
ture sets, and notice that they have not improved sub-
stantially in the past 3 years. This suggests it may be
difficult to reduce significantly the bounds we computed
with the current state-of-the-art feature sets.
Code
We wrote a comprehensive Python framework to per-
form tests on WF attacks and defenses, which collects
the efforts of WF researchers into a unified API. We also
implemented our method to derive security bounds on
a defense. Both can be found at:
https://github.com/gchers/wfes.
2 Website Fingerprinting
We presently provide an informal description of WF at-
tacks; we will formalize these concepts in section 4.
In WF attacks, a passive eavesdropper observes the
encrypted traffic produced by a victim while she loads
web pages via an encrypted tunnel (e.g., a VPN, Tor).
It is assumed that the adversary does not know the IP
address of the web server to which the victim sends
her requests, and that he cannot decrypt the packets.
However, he is generally allowed to know which defense
the victim uses. The adversary selects a set of web pages
(monitored pages), and his goal is to predict which of
those pages the victim visits, if any.
A Closed World scenario is when the victim is only
allowed to visit one of the monitored pages (Figure 1a).
This scenario is a simplification of real-world attacks,
but because it allows an adversary to perform the attack
in nearly-perfect conditions, it is used for evaluating the
security of defenses. An Open World scenario resembles
more closely a real-world setting, where the victim can
visit both monitored and unmonitored pages. This sce-
nario is typically used for evaluating attacks with re-
spect to their scalability to the real world. In addition
to the Closed World scenario, we will evaluate defenses
under the One VS All scenario, a special case of Open
World, which indicates the ability of a defense to protect
individual pages (Figure 1b). In the One VS All scenario
the adversary only monitors one web page, and the vic-
tim can either visit that page, or one of the unmonitored
pages; for this reason, this scenario can be seen as an
extreme case of the Open World scenario.
A WF attack has two phases: training and attack. In
the training phase, he generates defended network traf-
fic on his computer by loading monitored pages; then,
he extracts features from this traffic, and trains an ML
classifier on them. Features are high level descriptions
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(a) Closed World attack scenario. (b) One VS All attack scenario.
Fig. 1. In the Closed World scenario (a), the victim visits one page among those monitored by the adversary. In Open World, the vic-
tim is allowed to visit unmonitored pages. In One VS All (b), a special case of Open World, the adversary only monitors one page.
of data (network traffic, in this case), and will be for-
malized in section 4; our work demonstrates that the
choice of features crucially impacts the success of WF
attacks. The training phase can be performed offline. In
the attack phase, the adversary collects defended net-
work traffic coming from the victim. He extracts fea-
tures from the new traffic, and uses the ML classifier to
predict which web pages the victim loads.
3 Related Work
In this section, we will describe the major WF attacks
and defenses, and previous directions in provable eval-
uation of defenses.
3.1 Major defenses
WF defenses can be divided into deterministic, which
deterministically transform the characteristics of traffic,
and probabilistic (also called elsewhere random), where
randomness is involved in the morphing process. We will
consider six defenses: two deterministic (BuFLO and
Tamaraw), four probabilistic (Randomized Pipelining,
Decoy Pages, CS-BuFLO, WTF-PAD).
Designing a WF defense requires: i) understanding
of how WF attacks work and what they target, and ii)
engineering the defense on the top of other network pro-
tocols. In the past, probabilistic defenses have attracted
the attention of researchers because they are often easier
to implement, and they tend to introduce less overhead.
RP
Randomized Pipelining (RP) randomizes the order of
HTTP requests in the HTTP pipeline. This defense is
embedded by default in the Tor browser. Since in ex-
periments we will defend network traffic coming from
the Tor browser, we will implicitly assume RP is un-
derlying to any of the defenses we shall now present;
consequently, “No Defense” will refer to plain Tor traf-
fic (i.e., only defended using RP) [21].
BuFLO
For parameters (d, ρ, τ), BuFLO sends packets of fixed
size d, with frequency ρ, for at least τ time. If more time
is required by the page load, packets of size d are sent
with frequency ρ for the time needed [11].
Tamaraw
Similarly to BuFLO, it sends fixed-size packets at fixed
intervals. It considers distinct intervals between packets
with respect to their direction: outgoing packets are sent
every ρout seconds, incoming packets are sent every ρin
seconds, and ρout > ρin. It further pads the number of
packets sent in both directions by multiples of a padding
parameter [5].
Decoy Pages
Loads a randomly chosen page in background together
with the requested page. The traffic introduced by the
background page should confuse features and classifier
used by the adversary. It is a probabilistic defense, and it
is arguably the easiest to implement among the defenses
presented here [20].
CS-BuFLO
CS-BuFLO is a modification of BuFLO, which reduces
overheads and eases implementation. As with BuFLO,
it sends packets of size d with frequency ρ. However, the
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value of ρ is dynamically adapted to the network band-
width, and events like client’s onLoad (i.e., the browser
has finished loading a page) and channel_idle are used
to determine the end of communication. Padding is also
inserted at the end of communication, up to a certain
transmission size [4].
WTF-PAD
WTF-PAD is based on Adaptive Padding (AP) [23].
At each endpoint (client, server), the defense sends real
or dummy packets according to the state (idle, burst,
gap) of an internal state machine. This allows adaptively
morphing traffic to avoid large overheads [15]. This de-
fense is relatively easy to implement, although it is cur-
rently not well understood how to optimally determine
the distributions that regulate transitions of the internal
state machines. For experiments we used the distribu-
tions proposed by Pulls [22].
3.2 Major attacks
We now itemize the most influential WF attacks. A WF
attack is denoted by a feature set and an ML classifier.
This will be formalized in section 4.
LL
The feature set of this attack is composed of the count of
packets with a certain direction and size, for each direc-
tion and size {↑, ↓} × (0, ...,MTU ], where MTU = 1500
is the maximum transmission unit. It uses the naïve
Bayes classifier (NB) for classification, with kernel den-
sity estimation (KDE) for estimating the conditional
probabilities [17].
VNG++
Its feature set includes total time span of a trace, total
per-direction bandwidth, and (direction, size) of each
sequence of contiguous outgoing packets (“bursts”). It
uses NB as a classifier [11].
k-NN
The feature set comprises general features (e.g., band-
width, and packet counts), unique packet lengths, fea-
tures related to packet ordering and bursts, and the
lengths of the first 20 packets accounting for direction
(set to negative for incoming packets). An algorithm
Rank Feature Description
1 # incoming packets
2 # outgoing packets (fraction of tot # packets)
3 # incoming packets (fraction of tot # packets)
4 Standard deviation of outgoing packet ordering list
5 # outgoing packets
6 Sum of items in the alternative concentration feature list
7 Average of outgoing packet ordering list
8 Sum of incoming, outgoing, and total # of packets
9 Sum of alternative # packets per second
10 Tot # packets
11-18 Packet concentration and ordering feature list
19 # incoming packets stats in first 30 packets
20 # outgoing packets stats in first 30 packets
Table 2. Best 20 features according to the recent feature analysis
by Hayes and Danezis [12].
also determines a set of weights for the features, accord-
ing to their importance; feature vectors are multiplied
by these weights before classification1. For classification,
it uses a custom modification of the k-Nearest Neighbors
classifier, which works as follows. To predict the label
for an object x, the classifier first determines the k clos-
est objects to x. If all of them have the same label, it
predicts that label; otherwise, it outputs an empty pre-
diction. Manhattan distance is used as a distance metric
for the classifier [26].
CUMUL
The feature set of this attack includes basic information
of packet sequences (e.g., total bandwidth, total in/out
packets), together with the cumulative sum of packets’
sizes. The attack employs a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier with an RBF kernel, and uses cross
validation (CV) grid search to determine the optimal
parameters for the kernel [19].
k-FP
This is currently the state-of-the-art attack. The feature
set of this attack comes from a systematic analysis of
the features proposed by previous research. Importance
of features was evaluated with respect to the classifier
used for the attack (k-Nearest Neighbors); the 20 most
important features are in Table 2. In this attack, the
1 In the original attack, weights are used by the distance metric.
This is equivalent to multiplying weights before prediction.
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selected features are transformed using Random For-
est (RF) as follows. First, feature values from the orig-
inal feature set are extracted. Then, RF is applied to
these values for generating leaves; leaves are then used
as feature values for classification. As a classifier, this at-
tack employs the custom modification of the k-Nearest
Neighbors classifier that was used for the k-NN attack.
Hamming distance is used as a distance metric [12].
3.3 Previous directions in provable
evaluation of WF defenses
Cai et al. [5] proposed a method to compute a lower
bound of error for WF adversaries. They considered
an idealised lookup-table adversary, who knows exactly
what network traffic each web page can produce. The
adversary creates a look-up table T (p) = {w1, w2, ...},
that associates each packet sequence p of network traf-
fic to the set of web pages wi that can produce that
traffic (Figure 2). The packet sequences of two pages
are considered to be the same if all their packets have
the same size, direction and time. The error of such an
adversary is computed by counting the collisions (i.e.,
how many pages produce the same traffic), and is the
smallest error achievable by any WF adversary.
Fig. 2. The idealized lookup-table adversary proposed by Cai et
al. knows exactly what network traffic each web page (w1, w2,
...) may produce, and only commits an error when many pages
exhibit identical traffic.
This methodology has several downsides. The small-
est change in the quantities observed by the adversary
(e.g., time, total bandwidth), which is likely to hap-
pen in network communications because of noise, leads
similar traffic to be misclassified by the adversary. Fur-
thermore, the accuracy of such an adversary can only
be estimated for a defense if: i) the defense is determin-
istic, and ii) we know how it is constructed internally.
The second requirement is of particular interest: if we
were blindly applying this method to some defense, the
results would largely underestimate both probabilistic
and deterministic defenses, because of noise in network
data. In fact, Cai et al. only applied this method to
defenses for which, by design, only some characteris-
tics of the traffic (e.g. the total transmission size) could
change; even in this case, however, they had to apply the
method to partial information (e.g., they excluded tim-
ing information), as otherwise it would have returned
unreasonable bounds. We will highlight this via experi-
ments (section 9).
Recent work proposed an extension of the method
by Cai et al. for probabilistic defenses [28]. The method
attempts to compute the probability distribution of net-
work traffic defended by a defense, and to derive from it
the smallest error achievable. However, to estimate such
distribution i) they use a look-up table strategy, which
is highly susceptible to noise, and ii) they compute it
by running the defense a finite number of times. Be-
cause of these issues, the estimated distribution is not
guaranteed to approximate the real distribution, and
the method does not guarantee a valid bound.
4 Formalization of WF attacks
4.1 General concepts
W is a set containing all possible web pages. An ad-
versary selects a subset of such pages, Wm, which we
call monitored web pages. We define a set of unmon-
itored web pages, Wu, such that Wm ∩ Wu = ∅ and
Wm ∪ Wu ⊆ W. The victim can visit any page in
Wm ∪Wu. It is natural to assume that |Wm| > 0, and
|Wm ∪ Wu| > 1. We talk about Closed World scenario
when Wu = ∅. Open World scenario is when |Wu| > 0.
We also define the One VS All scenario, a subclass of
Open World, where the adversary only monitors one
web page: |Wm| = 1 and |Wu| > 0.
A packet sequence p ∈ P is a finite list of arrival
time tj , size sj , and direction dj of packets:
p = ((tj , sj , dj)) for j = 1, 2, ... ;
specifically, t1 = 0 and tj+1 ≥ tj , sj ∈ (0,MTU ],
where MTU (maximum transmission unit) is 1500, and
dj ∈ {↑, ↓}. As previous work [5], we assume that a WF
adversary, when observing the encrypted network traffic
corresponding to a page load, gets a packet sequence as
the only information.
A label y ∈ Y is associated with a packet sequence
p according to the web page w ∈ W that produced it.
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Specifically,
y(w) =
{
w if w ∈ Wm
¤ otherwise
;
in other words, symbol ¤ represents a page that is not
monitored.
A WF defense is a (possibly randomized) algorithm
D : P Ô→ P that takes as input a packet sequence, and
returns a defended packet sequence. Note that D also
includes the trivial “no-defense” algorithm, which sim-
ply outputs its input packet sequence.
A WF adversary is a pair A = (Φ,T) of a feature
set Φ and an ML training algorithm T, as we shall now
explain into details. A feature set is a list of algorithms2:
Φ = (φ1, φ2, ..., φQ) ,
with φq : P Ô→ Rdq and dq > 0 for q = 1, 2, ..., Q; each φq
gets as input a packet sequence, and returns a vector of
dq real values. With a slight abuse of notation, we will
use Φ to refer to the algorithm:
Φ : P Ô→ X ,
which runs each φq on an input packet sequence p, and
concatenates the resulting vectors of values:
Φ(p) = (φ1(p), φ2(p), ..., φQ(p)) ;
We call X = Rd the object space, where d = ∑Qq=1 dq,
and we call x = Φ(p) an object. An ML training algo-
rithm T : (X × Y)∗ Ô→ F is an algorithm that accepts
an arbitrary number of pairs of objects and respective
labels, and returns an algorithm f ∈ F from the collec-
tion of algorithms F = {f | f : X Ô→ Y}. We call f a
classifier. A training algorithm T is class-specific, in the
sense that it returns classifiers of a specific class (e.g.,
logistic regression, SVM).
4.2 WF attacks
We shall now describe a WF attack. Consider the case
in which a victim uses defense D to protect her traf-
fic. In the training phase, a WF adversary A = (Φ,T)
2 There is often confusion in what “features” indicate. In in-
formal discussion, the terms are used ambiguously for both the
algorithms that extract values, and the values themselves. From
now on, we use “features” and “feature set” to indicate the al-
gorithms extracting feature values. As indicated shortly, we will
call “object” a vector of values extracted using features.
generates n pairs of packet sequences, defended using
defense D, and respective labels:
((p′i, yi)) = ((D(pi), yi)) i = 1, 2, ..., n ,
with yi ∈ Wm. The adversary first extracts objects
from the packet sequences, obtaining what is commonly
called the training set:
Ztrain = ((xi, yi)) = ((Φ(p′i), yi)) i = 1, 2, ..., n .
Then, he trains a classifier on the training set: f =
T(Ztrain). In the attack phase, the victim visits a web
page with label yn+1 ∈ Y, using defense D, which pro-
duces a defended packet sequence p′n+1. The adversary
eavesdrops this packet sequence, extracts a test object
xn+1 = Φ(p′n+1), and outputs a prediction yˆn+1 =
f(xn+1).
The adversary is evaluated in terms of the proba-
bility that classifier f misclassifies the test object xn+1:
RA = P (f(xn+1) Ó= yn+1) .
In practice, this probability is estimated using the
empirical error RˆA, by averaging the error committed
by the adversary over a test set of ntest pairs:
Ztest = ((xi, yi)) i = n+ 1, n+ 2, ..., n+ ntest ,
as follows:
RˆA = 1
ntest
n+ntest∑
i=n+1
I(f(xi) Ó= yi) ,
where I is the indicator function.
4.3 Assumptions
The following analysis makes the standard i.i.d. assump-
tion on ((x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn), (xn+1, yn+1)); that
is, examples are independently sampled from the same
(arbitrary) distribution. In other words, we expect that
the traffic produced by each web page follows the same
distribution. Violations of this assumption (e.g., the ad-
versary trains on a different version of the web page)
would be disadvantageous for an adversary [14]. No as-
sumption is made about the underlying distribution.
We assume labels y ∈ Y are equally likely. While this
assumption is not necessary, it was shown that the ratio
of an adversary’s success and random guessing probabil-
ity, which is inversely related to the privacy parameter
ε we will introduce in the next section, is maximized by
uniform priors [3]; similarly, ε is minimized by uniform
priors. Nevertheless, when true priors are known, one
can use them to compute the bounds we will present.
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5 Bounds on WF adversaries
We present a method to provide security bounds for a
WF defense, with respect to the class of WF adversaries
using feature set Φ:
AΦ = {A | A = (Φ, ·)} ;
this class captures any choice of training algorithm T.
The method is based on the optimality of the Bayes clas-
sifier, and on the empirical estimation of its probability
of error. We then define a privacy metric based on this
result, which can be used for evaluating the security of
WF defenses.
5.1 Bayes error: an intuition
We assume that objects belonging to each label are
drawn from some (unknown) probability distribution
(i.i.d. assumption, subsection 4.3). For illustration sake,
let us consider objects with only one feature: total com-
munication time; this feature has indeed good discrim-
inating power [11], and is difficult to hide using coun-
termeasures. Figure 3 shows probability distribution es-
timates (KDE fits3) of the total communication time
when loading two web pages from the WCN+ dataset; this
dataset will be introduced in section 6. The goal of a
classifier is to commit the smallest error at distinguish-
ing between the two distributions. Assuming that i) the
distributions shown in Figure 3 were the “true” ones,
and that ii) they were known to a classifier, then the
best strategy for such classifier would be predicting the
most likely web page given an observation, according to
the Bayes rule on these distributions. For example, if
the observed communication time was 5, this classifier
would predict Web Page 1. Under these idealized cir-
cumstances, the smallest error achievable is denoted by
the uncertainty area in red: this area is called the Bayes
error. Note that this performance limit derives from the
distribution of data, and no classifier (even if computa-
tionally unbounded) can do better on this feature.
In practice, we typically do not know the true un-
derlying probability distributions. However, there exist
methods for estimating the Bayes error from data, with-
out any further assumption on the distributions them-
3 KDE, similarly to histograms, is a non-parametric technique
for estimating probability distributions; we used it here as a
purely illustrative mean to introduce the concept of Bayes error.
These should not be expected to be the true distributions.
selves. The remainder of this section will formalize the
optimality of the Bayes error, indicate a lower bound
estimate of it, and apply these results to evaluate the
security of WF defenses.
Fig. 3. Distributions (KDE fits) of total communication time of
the first two web pages of the WCN+ dataset. The uncertainty area
(“Bayes error”, if the KDE fits were the true distributions) is the
smallest achievable error when only using total communication
time as a feature.
5.2 Optimality of the Bayes classifier
Let ((x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn), (xn+1, yn+1)) be i.i.d.
pairs of objects xi ∈ X and respective labels yi ∈ Y.
The pairs are generated according to some distribution
over X × Y. We call training set the pairs:
((xi, yi)) i = 1, 2, ..., n ,
and we refer to xn+1 as the test object. An ML classifi-
cation task requires finding a classifier f : X Ô→ Y which
minimizes the probability of error:
P (f(xn+1) Ó= yn+1) .
For any classification task, the Bayes classifier is the
idealized classifier that minimizes this error. Formally,
let F be the collection of all classifiers {f | f : X Ô→ Y},
let Rf and R∗ be respectively the probability of error of
a classifier f ∈ F and of the Bayes classifier in predicting
a label for the test object. Then:
R∗ = min
f∈F
Rf . (1)
A proof of this can be found in the second chapter of
the book “Pattern Classification” by Duda et al. [10].
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The Bayes classifier is a function of prior proba-
bilities and probability density functions over X × Y;
unfortunately, these quantities are most often unknown
in practice, and the Bayes classifier is simply an ideal
optimum classifier. Nevertheless, as shown in the next
section, it is possible to estimate the Bayes error R∗ on
the basis of the error of other classifiers.
5.3 Lower bound estimate of Bayes error
The true Bayes error is typically not known in practice,
for the same reason that the Bayes classifier cannot be
used (i.e., true probability distributions are unknown).
Many methods, however, exist to estimate the Bayes
error R∗. We used a well-known lower bound estimate
of R∗, due to Cover and Hart [8], which is based on the
error of the Nearest Neighbor (NN) classifier.
The NN classifier works as follows. Let
((x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn)) be a training set, and xn+1
be a test object for which we want to predict the label.
NN predicts for xn+1 the label of its closest object.
Closeness is determined with respect to some distance
metric; the guarantees we are about to formulate are
however independent of the metric. We require that
xi, for i = 1, 2, ..., n + 1, take values from a separable4
metric space X .
The following result holds for the NN classifier. Let
us consider a specific L-labels classification setting; i.e.,
L = |Y|. Let RNN be the probability that the NN clas-
sifier trained on a training set of size n misclassifies a
test object. Then, asymptotically, as n→∞ [8]:
R∗ ≤ RNN ≤ R∗
(
2− L
L− 1R
∗
)
.
This holds for arbitrary distributions on X × Y.
From this inequality, it is possible to derive a lower
bound of R∗:
L− 1
L
(
1−
√
1− L
L− 1R
NN
)
≤ R∗ . (2)
We can now define a lower bound estimate of the Bayes
classifier’s error as:
Rˆ∗ = L− 1
L
(
1−
√
1− L
L− 1 Rˆ
NN
)
, (3)
4 Separability of a metric space means it contains a countable
dense subset; informally, it contains a countable subset whose
points are arbitrarily close to its points. Note that the Euclidean
Rd metric space and all finite metric spaces are separable.
where RˆNN is the error of the NN classifier computed
on a dataset5.
5.4 Bounding AΦ adversaries
From the previous discussion it follows that the error of
a WF adversary using feature set Φ is asymptotically
lower-bounded by Rˆ∗ estimated for the same features.
Theorem 1. Fix a feature set Φ. Sample Z =
((x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn+1, yn+1)) i.i.d. from an arbi-
trary distribution, where xi take values from a separable
metric space X and yi ∈ Y for i = 1, 2, ..., n + 1, let
Ztrain = ((x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn)), and L = |Y|.
For any training algorithm T ∈ T , where T = {T |
T : (X × Y)∗ Ô→ F} with F = {f | f : X Ô→ Y}, let
A = (Φ,T), let RA be the probability that the classi-
fier f = T(Ztrain) misclassifies a test object xn+1; also,
let RˆNN be the probability of error of the NN classifier
trained on Ztrain in predicting xn+1, and let Rˆ∗ be a
Bayes error lower bound computed from RˆNN and L as
in Equation 3. Then, as n→∞:
Rˆ∗ ≤ R∗ ≤ RA ,
where R∗ is the error of the Bayes classifier, which has
perfect knowledge of the prior probabilities and probabil-
ity distributions from which Z was sampled.
Proof. The second inequality, R∗ ≤ RA, follows triv-
ially from the fact that the Bayes classifier commits
the smallest error among the collection of classifiers
F = {f | X Ô→ Y} (Equation 1), and any training algo-
rithm T ∈ T returns a model f ∈ F .
Because Rˆ∗ is computed as in Equation 3, for which
holds Equation 2, Rˆ∗ ≤ R∗ holds asymptotically in n [8].
In practice, we do not have infinite examples, and we
need to compute the lower bound Rˆ∗ on a finite dataset.
In section 7 we show empirically that the error bound
estimate Rˆ∗, computed for a certain set of features, is
always smaller than the respective attack error.
The guarantee is independent of the NN classifier
distance metric. In subsection 7.1 we compared different
metrics, and selected Euclidean for experiments.
5 An implementation note: L
L−1 Rˆ
NN is usually smaller or equal
to 1. However, because of noise in experiments, this quantity
may assume a value larger than 1, making the value under square
root negative. In practice, we use 1 − min
(
L
L−1 Rˆ
NN , 1
)
under
square root to avoid this.
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5.5 Privacy metric
An error lower bound Rˆ∗ alone can be uninformative of
the setting under which it was obtained. For instance,
an error rate of 50% in a binary classification problem
is much worse than the same error achieved in 100-
labels classification; trivially, we can obtain 50% in bi-
nary classification by uniform random guessing, if labels
are equally likely, while the same strategy for 100 labels
would commit 99% error on average.
We borrow from cryptography the concept of advan-
tage (Adv), and use it to define a privacy metric for WF
defenses. Advantage indicates how better than random
guessing an adversary can do; it is typically defined in
a binary classification setting, with respect to the error
R of an adversary:
Adv = 2
∣∣∣∣12 −R
∣∣∣∣ ,
where 12 is the random guessing probability of error, and
2 is a normalizing factor. In an L-labels classification
setting, with L > 1 and assuming labels are equally
likely6, random guessing error becomes RG = L−1L , and
the generalized advantage is7:
Adv = 1
RG
∣∣RG −R∣∣ .
We introduce a privacy metric, (ε,Φ)-privacy, for a
feature set Φ and a privacy parameter ε defined as:
ε = 1−Adv ,
where Adv is computed in terms of Rˆ∗ estimated using
feature set Φ. The privacy parameter takes value 1 for a
perfectly private defense, where an adversary is forced
into random guessing; it takes value 0 if there exists an
adversary achieving an error close or equal to 0.
By reasonably assuming Rˆ∗ ≤ RG, the definition of
ε simplifies to:
ε = Rˆ
∗
RG
. (4)
For a feature set Φ and privacy parameter ε, we say a
defense is (ε,Φ)-private if the privacy parameter com-
puted for Φ is equal to ε.
6 As suggested in subsection 4.3, it is not necessary to assume
that labels are equally likely. If priors on labels were known, RG
would be the error of the majority classifier, 1−maxy∈Y P (y)
7 Typically in cryptography the advantage is defined in terms
of the success probability, rather than the error probability. The
expression we provide is equivalent, and the advantage is appro-
priately normalized to take values in [0,1].
5.6 Independence from features
A natural question raises from our discussion: is it possi-
ble to have a lower bound guarantee (and thus, a privacy
metric) that is independent from features?
The following result would seem to help [9]:
Remark 1. Let P be the original data space (packet
sequence space, in our setting). Let R∗P be the Bayes
error in the original space. For any transformation Φ :
P Ô→ X , mapping objects from the original space into a
new space X :
R∗P ≤ R∗Φ(P) . (5)
In other words, no transformation of the original data
improves the Bayes error, and an estimate computed on
full information would be valid regardless the choice of
features.
However, in practice, if the original data is noisy
and comes from a very large space, an error estimate in
the original space converges too slowly to its optimum,
and it is necessary to operate on transformations of the
data. The same applies to the WF setting: the error
bound estimate computed in the packet sequence space
converges too slowly (subsection 7.4), which is also why
WF researchers typically constructed attacks on feature
sets and not directly on packet sequences.
In section 10, we introduce the concept of efficient
feature set, as a future research direction towards inde-
pendence from features.
6 Experimental Methodology
Experiments aimed at verifying the validity of the Bayes
error estimate Rˆ∗, evaluating improvements in features,
and measuring the privacy of WF defenses using (ε,Φ)-
privacy. We conducted experiments for the most in-
fluential attacks and defenses on the dataset from the
USENIX 2014 paper by Wang et al. [26]8. Henceforth,
we refer to this dataset as WCN+.
Dataset
The WCN+ dataset is a collection of network traces pro-
duced by visiting, over Tor, 100 unique web pages 90
times each. Since the data represents Tor traffic, where
8 https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~t55wang/.
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packets have a fixed size, attacks using size of packets
as a feature may be penalized.
Background noise
The privacy bounds of a WF defense should be deter-
mined under optimal conditions for the adversary. Any
noise in the data, such as that introduced by background
web pages or by external applications (e.g. BitTorrent
client), would produce an overestimate of the defense’s
privacy. For this reason, we did not add any further
noise to the dataset.
Distribution of the labels in the test set
We designed the experiments so that training and test
sets would have a uniform distribution of labels. This
prevents an unbalance towards web pages that are eas-
ier to defend, which would cause overestimates of the
privacy.
Scenarios
We performed experiments in the Closed World and
One VS All scenarios. The former is of common use
when evaluating defenses, and it indicates the ability
of an adversary to distinguish many pages in nearly-
perfect conditions. One VS All is an extreme case of
Open World scenario, in which an adversary only tar-
gets one web page. This scenario highlights how well
a defense protects unique pages. We remark that our
method is applicable to any other case of Open World.
Code
The code of the major WF attacks and defenses is
openly available, and it is usually written in Python or
C. We acknowledge the use of the following code:
– T. Wang: Decoy Pages, BuFLO, Tamaraw, k-NN9
– K. P. Dyer: VNG++, LL10
– J. Hayes: k-FP11
– M. Juarez: WTF-PAD12.
We created a Python framework to abstract the different
APIs employed by researchers, with the goal of unifying
9 https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~t55wang/wf.html.
10 https://github.com/kpdyer/website-fingerprinting.
11 https://github.com/jhayes14/k-FP.
12 https://github.com/wtfpad/wtfpad.
Distance Rˆ∗ (%) Feature Set
Euclidean 5.8 k-NN
Standardized Euclidean 6.0 CUMUL
City Block 6.6 k-NN
Levenshtein 12.2 packets’ sizes
Table 3. Comparison of the Nearest Neighbor-based lower bound
Rˆ∗ obtained using different distance metrics. Experiments were
performed against No Defense (RP), on the WCN+ dataset. In this
table, the name of an attack refers to its feature set.
the way experiments are carried out in WF research. We
implemented CS-BuFLO, and the CUMUL attack, and
adapted other researchers’ code to the API. We created
routines to compute error bounds and (ε,Φ)-privacy of
WF defenses as they are described in this paper.
7 Experimental Analysis of the
Method
In this section, we verify the validity of the lower bound
of error Rˆ∗ defined in section 5 for the major attacks.
We then discuss whether a privacy metric dependent on
features is reasonable, by showing that feature sets from
recent attacks have not improved significantly (if at all).
7.1 What Distance Metric
The lower bound estimate Rˆ∗ depends on a distance
metric. Whilst its guarantee holds regardless this choice,
different metrics may perform better on our data.
We experimented with four distance metrics: Eu-
clidean, Standardized Euclidean, City Block and Lev-
enshtein. The first three distances were applied to fea-
ture sets; the bound of the best performing feature set
is shown. We applied Levenshtein distance directly to
packet sequences as follows. Given a packet sequence
((tj , sj , dj)), we created a binary string containing 0
when dj =↑, and 1 when dj =↓; this makes sense in the
context of Tor traffic, where packets’ sizes are the same;
by doing so we excluded timing information. We then
computed the NN-based bound on the binary strings
using Levenshtein as a distance metric.
Results in Table 3 indicate a choice between Eu-
clidean, Standardized Euclidean and City Block does
not impact heavily on the bound. Levenshtein distance,
however, performed poorly; this may be due to the fact
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that it does not consider timing information. In the fol-
lowing experiments we used Euclidean distance.
7.2 Empirical validity of the bound
Under the sole i.i.d. assumption, it is not possible to
prove convergence rates of a Bayes error estimate (sub-
section 10.3). We studied the asymptotic guarantee of
Rˆ∗ in finite sample conditions experimentally, for an
increasing number n of training examples. We used the
following heuristics to verify the estimates’ convergence:
– verify that Rˆ∗ computed for a feature set is lower
than the error of an attack performed with the same
feature set;
– visually inspect that the decreasing trend of Rˆ∗ be-
comes slower as n increases.
We performed these experiments in a Closed World
scenario on the WCN+ dataset, which is composed of
ntot = 9000 network traces from 100 distinct pages. We
kept a fixed test set of size ntest = 0.2× ntot, and itera-
tively increased the number of traces of the training set:
n = {0.1 × ntot, 0.2 × ntot, ..., 0.8 × ntot}. To show that
the bound is valid for adversaries predicting new data,
we computed the bound only on the training set, and
compared it with the attack error on the test set. More
specifically, for an adversary A = (Φ,T), we computed
the attack error RA by training the attack’s classifier on
the training set, and predicting the test set. We com-
puted the lower bound Rˆ∗, for the same feature set Φ,
on the training set, using 5-folds cross validation (CV)
to reduce the variance.
Figure 4 presents the results of these experiments.
Each color represents a set of features; continuous lines
indicate the error of an attack, and dashed lines error
bounds. The figure shows that, for any size of the train-
ing set, the bound estimate computed for a feature set is
a lower bound of the error committed by an attack using
the same features. Furthermore, the decreasing trend of
the estimates seems to converge towards an asymptote.
7.3 Evolution of feature sets
The Bayes error indicates the smallest error achievable
when using a certain feature set. We use Rˆ∗ to compare
the feature sets of major WF attacks, and address the
question: did feature sets improve in recent attacks?
We computed the bounds in a Closed World sce-
nario, on the full WCN+ dataset, using 5-folds CV. Ta-
ble 4 shows the evolution of feature sets in the major
attacks from 2006 to 2017. We observe that, against
most defenses, the feature set used by the 2014 attack
k-NN [26] performs nearly as well as the one employed
by the current state-of-the-art attack, k-FP [12].
These results support the following hypothesis: im-
proving feature sets is becoming harder, and there may
be a limit for their improvement. This strengthens the
value of a privacy metric depending on a feature set.
We remark however that these findings should not
discourage WF studies to improve classifiers: while R∗
is the smallest error achievable by a classifier, a pri-
ori we do not know which classifier will reach it. Fur-
thermore, as suggested by Devroye et al. (chapter 32 in
reference [9]), if the goal is improving an attack, then
features should be optimized with respect to the chosen
classifier’s empirical error rather than Rˆ∗; the reason
they give is that no Bayes error estimate can guarantee
good performance (subsection 10.3).
7.4 Rˆ∗ on full information
Instead of selecting a set of features, we estimated the
error bound Rˆ∗ using full information, and compared it
with the ones achieved by the best feature sets.
We concatenated time and size of each packet se-
quence to form a vector, and padded such vector to the
same length. We used Euclidean distance in this space
to estimate the Bayes error.
The bounds obtained on full information were worse
than those achieved using feature sets (Figure 5). This
result is not surprising: as we discussed in subsection 5.6,
in the real world, classifiers tend to converge more
rapidly in the feature space than in the original space.
This shows that in the context of WF we need to rely on
feature sets. However, we notice that, for some defenses
(Tamaraw, CS-BuFLO), the bounds computed on full
information are close to the error of the best classifiers
(Appendix B). This suggests their bounds may be valid
independently of the chosen feature set.
Future research may also find a better performing
distance metric, which might favor a quicker conver-
gence of the Bayes error estimate directly computed in
the packet sequence space.
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Fig. 4. Validity of the lower bound Rˆ∗ on the WCN+ dataset (Closed World scenario), with respect to an increasing number of training
examples. The lower bound estimates Rˆ∗ (dashed lines) are smaller than the error of an attack (continuous lines) performed using the
same feature set (same color).
8 Evaluation of Defenses
We measured (ε,Φ)-privacy and overheads of the de-
fenses. We computed error bounds and (ε,Φ)-privacy
under Closed World and One VS All scenarios. For this
experiment, we used the full WCN+ dataset.
We computed the packet overhead OhbD for each
packet sequence p and a defense D as:
OhbD =
( |D(p)|
|p| − 1
)
× 100 ,
where |p| indicates the number of packets in packet se-
quence p. We computed the time overhead OhtD by di-
viding the difference tü − t1 for packets in packet se-
quence p by the same computed for packets in p′. We
report the median overhead among packet sequences for
both Ohb and Oht.
For the Closed World scenario, we considered all
the dataset, extracted the features, and computed Rˆ∗
(Equation 3) using 5-folds CV. We then determined
(ε,Φ)-privacy. Random guessing error in this scenario
(100-labels classification setting) was 0.99.
In the One VS All case, for each potential target
w ∈ W, we took all 90 examples from web page w, and
then randomly selected 90 examples from other pages,
which we labeled ¤. Finally, we computed the bounds in
this binary classification setting, where random guess-
ing error was 0.5. Since the method produced a bound
for each page, indicating its fingerprintability, we aver-
aged these results. In this scenario, we observed a high
variance, which is due to the heterogeneity of the pages.
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Liberatore et al. (2006) Dyer et al. (2012) Wang et al. (2014) Panchenko et al. (2016) Hayes et al. (2016)
No Defense 20.8 17.2 6.2 7.3 8.2
Decoy Pages 77.8 74.9 42.6 62.5 56.2
BuFLO 60.6 60.9 62.8 60.0 56.9
Tamaraw 84.4 69.8 69.0 70.3 69.0
CS-BuFLO 66.4 64.5 62.9 63.0 61.9
WTF-PAD 69.8 65.3 60.2 54.9 48.6
Table 4. Evolution of feature sets. The smallest error achievable (Rˆ∗) when using the feature sets of the major attacks up to 2017,
against the most influential WF defenses. The bound of the best feature set for each defense is in bold. Feature sets have not im-
proved substantially since the attack by Wang et al. (2014). Bounds were computed on the WCN+ dataset in a Closed World scenario.
Fig. 5. Comparison of lower bounds Rˆ∗ computed using full infor-
mation (i.e., in the packet sequence space) and those computed
using the feature sets of the best attacks (k-NN, k-FP). Bounds
computed on full information do not converge rapidly enough,
and are invalidated by those using feature sets.
We also considered taking the minimum of the bounds
as an alternative to averaging. Unfortunately, to date no
defense is able to achieve a minimum bound better than
2.9% (Tamaraw). Future work may consider alternative
methods to combine error bounds in this scenario.
Table 1 shows the results in both scenarios. Results
indicate that the best defense for the Closed World sce-
nario is Tamaraw. However, we notice that BuFLO and
Decoy Pages outperform Tamaraw in the One VS All
scenario. This suggests that Decoy Pages, a very sim-
ple defense to implement, could be a safe choice for de-
fending individual pages from WF attacks. Results also
confirm that Tor Browser’s default defense (RP) is in-
effective, as previously suggested by attacks [6, 14, 27].
Defense Rˆ∗ (%) Cai et al. (%) Cai et al. - full (%)
BuFLO 57 53 19
Tamaraw 69 91 11
Table 5. Comparison of the bound for deterministic defenses
suggested by Cai et al. and the lower bound estimate Rˆ∗. The
last column indicates the bound by Cai et al. on full information,
which indicates its susceptibility to noise.
9 Comparison with previous
evaluation
We computed the bound proposed by Cai et al. [5] on
the full WCN+ dataset. As discussed in subsection 3.3, this
method is only applicable to deterministic defenses, and
it needs to be adapted to the defense.
We estimated the bound by Cai et al. for defenses
BuFLO and Tamaraw. With the goal of reducing noise,
the method requires limiting the information available
to an adversary: against BuFLO, an adversary can only
observe the transmission size; against Tamaraw, the
number of incoming and outgoing packets.
Table 5 compares the bound by Cai et al. with Rˆ∗.
Results do not exhibit any particular trend: the bound
by Cai et al. is larger than Rˆ∗ for Tamaraw, but smaller
for BuFLO. We notice, however, that for Tamaraw their
error bound is higher than the error of the best per-
forming attack (86.6%, VNG++) (Figure 4). This may
be due to noise in the data.
To better grasp the impact of noise on their method,
we estimated the bound using all the information avail-
able to a real-world adversary (Table 5). Interestingly,
in this case the error bound for Tamaraw was smaller
than the one for BuFLO. This indicates that the lookup-
table strategy is strongly affected by noise, which sug-
gests that it may not be reliable for evaluating security.
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10 Discussion and Conclusion
Past WF attacks employed new combinations of ML
classifiers and feature sets to defeat defenses. We showed
that a Bayes error lower bound estimate Rˆ∗ bounds the
error of a WF adversary using a certain feature set,
regardless his choice of classifier. On this basis, we in-
troduced privacy metric (ε,Φ)-privacy for WF defenses,
based on Rˆ∗, that indicates how far a defense is from a
perfectly private one. We shall now discuss open ques-
tions and future directions.
10.1 Towards ε-privacy
Our work encourages WF research to shift its focus to-
wards features. It further gives a tool to help future
studies in this direction: the error estimate Rˆ∗, a lower
bound of the error of any adversary using a certain fea-
ture set, can also be used to evaluate feature sets inde-
pendently of a classifier (Table 4).
Whilst our results suggest that finding better per-
forming features is becoming harder, we recognize that
one limitation of (ε,Φ)-privacy is its dependence on a
set of features. Future research may attempt to formu-
late a similar guarantee independently of features. We
call ε-privacy such a guarantee, which is defined as fol-
lows. Let P be the range of a defense D. Let Φ∗ be the
set of all the features that can be extracted from p ∈ P.
Then D is ε-private if it is (ε,Φ)-private for some Φ, and
for any Φ′ ⊂ Φ∗, guaranteeing (ε′,Φ′)-privacy, holds:
ε ≤ ε′ + δ ,
for an arbitrary δ ≥ 0; that is, D is ε-private if the
value of ε achieved by a feature set Φ is proven to be
the smallest up to some negligible additive term δ.
10.2 Computational bounds
Whilst recent WF research attempted to optimize the
computational time and storage required to perform at-
tacks (e.g., [12, 27]), researchers have not imposed com-
putational bounds to WF adversaries. Further research
could look at ways to improve the lower bound estimates
for computationally boundedWF adversaries, instead of
the unbounded adversary we modeled in this paper.
In the context of feature sets, we suggest future re-
search should also direct its attention towards efficient
feature sets, as we shall now define. Let R∗P be the Bayes
error committed when using full information. An effi-
cient feature set Φ is a feature set that satisfies:
1. R∗Φ(P) = R
∗
P + δ for a negligible δ ≥ 0;
2. a Bayes error estimate on Φ(P) converges quickly;
3. Φ : P Ô→ X is bounded in time and memory.
10.3 Bayes error estimates
We opted for a well-studied asymptotic lower bound es-
timate of the Bayes error, which is based on the error of
the NN classifier. Future work may explore other esti-
mates in order to obtain tighter bounds. Unfortunately,
i) no Bayes error estimate can guarantee on its perfor-
mances (Theorem 8.5 in reference [9]), ii) under the re-
laxed i.i.d. assumption on data it is not possible to prove
any convergence rate for a Bayes error estimate [1]; we
will thus need to evaluate convergence experimentally
for any estimate.
In our experiments we also evaluated a Bayes error
lower bound estimate that is based on the error of the
k-NN classifier (Appendix A). Results indicate this es-
timate has an undesired property: its validity highly de-
pends on the chosen parameters. It is although possible
to use such estimate with a careful choice of parameters.
A further option is to use an ensemble of Bayes error
estimates; for example, see reference [25].
When the true distributions are known, however,
it is possible to compute the Bayes error directly. Re-
cent probabilistic defense ALPaCA samples web pages’
characteristics from known distributions [7]; it may be
possible in this case to compute the Bayes error by tak-
ing into account such distributions.
10.4 Rˆ∗ and (ε,Φ)-privacy
Both Rˆ∗ and (ε,Φ)-privacy are valid metrics for eval-
uating the privacy of a defense against WF attacks.
(ε,Φ)-privacy, which is related to the concept of advan-
tage widely used in cryptography, gives a more precise
idea of how far a defense is from a perfect one (that
is, one that forces an adversary into random guessing),
and should thus be preferred to evaluate the security of
defenses. The privacy parameter ε is also related to the
multiplicative leakage, introduced in Quantitative Infor-
mation Flow, which indicates how much information a
system leaks about its input [3]. Rˆ∗ may be used for
comparing feature sets independently of a classifier.
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10.5 Other applications of the method
Future research may apply our method to evaluate the
security against other ML-based attacks. If an adver-
sary uses an ML classifier to violate security properties,
we can immediately estimate security bounds for the
proposed countermeasures in a black-box manner. For
example, in the case of traffic analysis, we can directly
evaluate the ability of a defense to protect the under-
lying behavior of any source of data. Furthermore, if
the information available to the adversary in some ML-
based attack is limited (e.g., data has small dimensions),
the estimated bounds in such context would be immedi-
ately feature-independent, giving ε-privacy guarantees.
10.6 Conclusions
We showed that there exist natural bounds on any WF
adversary, and that we can estimate and use them to
evaluate the privacy of any WF defense in a black-box
manner. We expect this will be used to evaluate the
privacy of padding schemes in protocols such as Tor,
SSH, and TLS.
We hope our work inspires further research to for-
malize security for WF and generic ML-based attacks,
for even more realistic adversaries (e.g., computation-
ally bounded adversaries). We suspect this will help
moving from (ε,Φ)-privacy to ε-privacy. Nonetheless,
we reiterate that our framework already provides secu-
rity guarantees, and that it allows future proposals and
evaluations of WF defenses to only focus on the state-
of-the-art features in order to show their privacy.
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A kn-NN Bayes error estimate
An optimistically biased estimate of R∗ is the resubsti-
tution error R(R) of the kn-NN classifier [9]. The resub-
stitution error is the error committed by a classifier on
its training set. The kn-NN classifier is a k-NN classifier
for which the number of neighbors kn changes in func-
tion of n. Let kn be such that kn → ∞, and kn/n → 0
as n→∞. Then R(R) converges (from below, in expec-
tation) to R∗ as n→∞ [24].
Convergence from below would be an interesting
property for our purposes. Unfortunately, our results
suggest this bound’s validity strongly depends on the
choice of kn. We considered kn =
√
n and kn = log(n).
Figure 6 compares the kn-NN bounds with the NN
bound (Equation 2) and with the best attack’s error.
While the kn-NN bound with kn = log(n) slightly im-
proves on the NN bound, kn =
√
n is always invali-
dated. For this paper, we conservatively relied on the
NN bound. However, we highlight that the kn-NN es-
timate may be used with an appropriate choice of kn.
B Lower bounds on full
information
Figure 7 shows all the bounds computed on full infor-
mation, as explained in subsection 7.4.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of kn-NN bounds with the NN bound Rˆ∗ and attacks’ error. These experiments were done against “No Defense”
in a Closed World scenario.
Fig. 7. Comparison of lower bounds Rˆ∗ computed using full information (i.e., packet sequences) and those computed using the fea-
ture sets from the best attacks (k-NN, k-FP) on the WCN+ dataset. Results show that bounds using full information typically do not
converge quickly enough.
